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International engagement in sub-Saharan Africa’s power sector is increasing rapidly. Aid is used to 
directly finance a growing number of foreign companies to implement power projects, accompanied by 
calls for policy and governance reform. This paper argues that while new and much-needed finance is 
becoming available, the current approach to foreign support poses several new challenges for broad and 
sustainable long-term development of the African power sector. They include a focus on creating market 
opportunities for non-African rather than domestic companies, the difficulty of delivering large-scale rural 
electrification through the externally advocated market-based approach, economic inefficiencies of 
current aid spending, and the difficulty of tackling complex, country-specific issues with continental 
electrification initiatives. To address these challenges, we suggest to redirect public funds towards rural 
electrification, increase African ownership, individualise policy interventions and ease the current types 
of neoliberal conditionalities. 
,  
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INTRODUCTION 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) current electricity situation is alarming. Roughly 675 million 
people live without access, SSA firms experience 8.5 power outages on average per month, 
and the rural electrification stands at 15% (World Bank, 2018). Increased electricity access in 
SSA has been linked to economic development, local income generation, literacy 
improvements, and better health care (Abdullah and Markandya, 2012; Cook, 2011). Universal 
access by 2030 is a UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG). 
The international community has recognised the necessity to act on electrification in SSA. 
Currently, there are at least 60 international financing initiatives aimed at the region’s power 
sector (Quitzow et al., 2016; Tagliapietra and Bazilian, 2017). Foreign capital investments, 
albeit existing data imperfections, appear to have risen significantly in the last decade. The 
most recent data, supplied by the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA), suggest that 
capital expenditure (CAPEX) commitments have come predominantly from outside Africa 
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since the large-scale US-led Power Africa initiative was launched in 2013 (The Infrastructure 
Consortium for Africa, 2016; The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, 2017). While the 
current total annual commitments considerably exceed SSA’s power sector CAPEX from 10 
years ago, only 25% of which stems from African governments. By contrast, between 2001 
and 2006, the majority of power sector CAPEX was spent by African governments (Foster and 
Briceño-Garmendia, 2010). Figure 1 illustrates this trend. 
 
 
Note: Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010) report actual CAPEX spending between 2001 and 2006, while the ICA reports CAPEX 
commitments. In its reports, ICA jointly states power sector and gas pipeline commitments. To only report power sector 
commitments here, the ICA figures have been lowered by 10%. According to both data sources, data inconsistencies such as double 
counting and misallocations cannot entirely be ruled out. The private sector figures closely match the World Bank’s Private 
Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database which includes both purely privately financed as well as public-private partnership 
(PPP) projects. 
Figure 1: Capital expenditure spent and commitments in the African power sector (data sources: (Foster and 
Briceño-Garmendia, 2010; The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, 2016; The Infrastructure Consortium 
for Africa, 2017)). 
 
A recent, growing literature has recognized and documented the rising importance of foreign 
public and private finance in SSA’s power sector (Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings, 2017; 
Eberhard et al., 2017; Gualberti et al., 2014; Moss and Bazilian, 2018; Tagliapietra and 
Bazilian, 2017). Scholars generally agree on the necessity of additional finance to reach the 
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SDG. They have pointed out that foreign private sector involvement and large-scale 
international initiatives like Power Africa are a significant part of securing these funds. 
This paper adds to this literature by critically analysing the implications of this rising foreign 
support for the long-term sustainable development of SSA’s power sector. It follows three 
steps. Firstly, it discusses four mechanisms under which the current foreign support operates, 
namely (1) the direct financing of non-African companies with development aid; (2) the 
growing number of foreign stakeholders; (3) the support provision beyond physical 
infrastructure; and (4) the conditionalities attached to receiving assistance. Secondly, this paper 
examines the long-term developmental implications of each of these four mechanisms. It draws 
from various policy reports and empirical cases including Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, Botswana, 
South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and 
Zambia, as well as several non-African countries. While acknowledging the positive impact on 
available finance and foreign know-how, this paper points out several that the current 
mechanisms of foreign involvement imply several new social, economic and political 
challenges. They include the focus on creating market opportunities for non-African rather than 
domestic companies, an associated risk of increased aid dependency, the difficulty of 
delivering large-scale rural electrification through the advocated market-based approach, 
economic inefficiencies of current aid spending, transparency issues, and the difficulty of 
tackling complex, country-specific issues with continental electrification initiatives. Thirdly, 
policy actions are recommended to foster long-term development, addressing each of the four 
mechanisms. The paper suggests to re-direct public aid towards rural electrification, increase 
knowledge transfer, customise policy interventions and ease current conditionalities to enable 
state-driven leadership. 
 
 
FOUR MECHANISMS OF CURRENT FOREIGN SUPPORT  
With financial commitments of over USD 54 billion, Power Africa constitutes the largest 
multinational African electrification initiative (Power Africa, 2017). Closer analyses of Power 
Africa and other international efforts uncover four dominant mechanisms of the rising foreign 
support for African electrification.  
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 1. Usage of aid to finance non-African companies. Since the early 1980s, the World Bank’s 
and International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) dominated 
aid provision to Africa. They consisted of loans given directly to African governments with the 
intention to economically stabilise the recipient countries. The subsequent Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs), introduced in 1999, intended to strengthen the ownership of African 
states and supported their poverty-reduction efforts. Their main means of aid delivery was 
direct budgetary support for African states and governmental ministries to help implement 
developmental policies (Unwin, 2004). Assistance to the energy sector was firmly embedded 
within these aid delivery regimes, and often coupled to neoliberal reform conditions 
(Söderholm, 1999). In the last decade, however, SSA’s energy sector has emerged as a focus 
area of aid. While total official development aid (ODA) from the OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) for SSA has been largely constant between 2007 and 2016, ODA 
for SSA’s energy sector specifically has increased by 600% during this time (OECD, 2018). In 
2016, DAC-countries committed as much aid to the energy sector as to education in SSA.  
This has coincided with a noticeable trend towards aid privatisation (Hook and Rumsey, 2016). 
Non-governmental actors have played an increasingly important role in aid delivery. 
Significant amounts of current public development assistance for African electrification are 
used to directly fund non-African companies. More than 90% of the USD 7 billion US 
commitment to Power Africa finances the US government agencies Export-Import Bank 
(EXIM) and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) (Power Africa, 2016a). Both 
provide capital and insurance to US companies investing in developing countries. Thereby, a 
considerable majority of US development aid to SSA’s power sector is de facto retained within 
the US economy. Indeed, official US estimates expect Power Africa commitments to generate 
a positive return for US taxpayers of USD 86 million (US Congressional Budget Office, 2014). 
China, similarly, delivers aid by directly financing Chinese companies to build infrastructure 
in SSA. Germany uses public funds to incentivise German companies to move into SSA, 
aiming to multiply the number of German companies active in SSA by six. Many electrification 
initiatives support public-private partnerships (PPPs) and promote foreign direct investments 
(FDIs) to further encourage foreign company engagement. 
2. Increasing number of foreign financers. In 2016, at least 43 different non-African 
governments and 28 public sector institutions have been engaged in at least 60 African 
electrification initiatives (Quitzow et al., 2016; Tagliapietra and Bazilian, 2017). This includes 
the 10 richest OECD countries, the EU, the UN and the World Bank. In addition to public 
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sector stakeholders, by 2016, Power Africa alone had coalesced over USD 40 billion from over 
100 private sector entities, mostly global engineering and equity companies such as General 
Electric, Standard Chartered Bank and Aldwych International (Power Africa, 2016b). 
International private sector engagement overall has increased steadily in the last decade 
(Eberhard et al., 2017).  
3. Support beyond physical infrastructure. Most African electrification initiatives engage 
with the power sector in an encompassing way. They include institutional and technical 
capacity building, policy reforms, partnership development, coordination and monitoring 
(Quitzow et al., 2016). Large-scale initiatives like Power Africa have developed toolkits to 
support transaction processes. For instance, Power Africa’s Understanding Power Purchase 
Agreements handbook and its African Legal Support Facility helped secure signing two 
generation projects worth 105 MW in Benin in 2016. In an attempt to increase transparency, 
Power Africa has made its Power Africa Tracking Tool (PATT) freely available, tracking the 
progress of electrification transactions in real-time (Figure 2).  
4. Conditionalities. Since the SAPs have been introduced in SSA in the 1980s, development 
aid has been coupled with conditionalities. Recipient countries had to implement a set of pre-
defined, neoliberal policies which limited the role of the state. While the subsequent PRSPs 
aimed at strengthening African ownership of developmental policies, they have continued aid 
conditionality and constrained state intervention (Cheru, 2006; Unwin, 2004; Zack-Williams 
and Mohan, 2005). This approach to aid deliverance remains salient in power sector 
endowments to SSA today. Power Africa’s reform goals include increasing commercial 
viability, market-based pricing, cutting subsidies, reducing import taxes and guaranteeing 
political liberties (Power Africa, 2016b). For example, after election rigging allegations 
surfaced in Tanzania in 2016, US agency Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) pulled 
out of a previously committed USD 473 million generation project. Other African 
electrification initiatives like Germany’s Energising Development or Norway’s Energy+ have 
similarly made funding conditional on policy reforms, reflecting the former country’s Fördern 
und Fordern (support and request) aid approach. 
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Note: Not all the above projects are financed by Power Africa, but they are all tracked in the PATT 
Figure 2: Overview of 297 potential Power Africa projects in 2016 monitored through the 
PATT (Power Africa, 2016a) 
 
 
THE MECHANISMS’ IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 
African electrification requires a long-term approach. Total electricity demand in SSA is 
projected to increase almost threefold between 2030 and 2050, requiring significant capacity 
additions (see Figure 3). This section analyses the implications and potential impact of each 
of the four foreign support mechanisms concerning long-term development in turn. It closes 
with Table 1 summarising the findings. 
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Note: Demand projections are the average of two potential scenarios presented by the 
World Energy Council (WEC) (World Energy Council, 2013). Capacity needs follow from 
assuming an average capacity factor range between 33% and 53% in 2050, depending on 
the energy mix. This capacity factor range is based on International Renewable Energy 
Agency (IRENA) results for SSA electricity planning (International Renewable Energy 
Agency, 2015), and increased by a further 10% to account for long-term uncertainties. 
Figure 3: Electricity demand projections for SAA (data sources: (International Renewable 
Energy Agency, 2015; World Energy Council, 2013), authors’ calculations)  
 
Implications of using aid to finance non-African companies 
Increased financing of foreign companies is raising private sector activity in African 
electrification (Power Africa, 2017), and the potential scale of new capacity additions. There 
are, however, several social, economic and environmental issues coupled with this 
mechanism. 
With respect to social issues, the crucial developmental need to electrify the rural population 
at scale appears to be difficult to achieve when aid is being used to fund foreign companies. 
This mechanism shifts the mandate of aid from African development towards foreign business 
interests. Over 80% of the unelectrified people in SSA live in rural areas, yet rural 
electrification in SSA does not present a market where companies easily achieve attractive 
margins. More than two-thirds of the unelectrified rural population lives in poverty (World 
Bank, 2018). In Kenya, poor rural households have required at least 10 years to pay the 
connection costs (Abdullah and Markandya, 2012). The Korean government granted the rural 
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poor 35 years to repay loans for upfront costs, an important factor in Korea’s holistic, state-
driven rural development programme (Van Gevelt, 2014). Limited liquidity and the long 
resulting cost-recovery timeframes are at odds with the private sector’s pressure to achieve 
short-term returns, especially for high-risk investments in politically and economically 
volatile countries. In addition, electrification initiatives often focus their efforts on 
quantitative targets for new capacity additions, thereby defining cost per MW as a key 
decision parameter (Quitzow et al., 2016). Power Africa, for instance, explicitly aims to add 
30,000 MW of installed capacity by 2030. Off-grid technologies, often best-suited to electrify 
rural households, are considerably more expensive per MW and less profitable than grid-
connected electricity which can be used to power the industrial sector. Despite contrary 
intentions, off-grid technologies account for only 0.9% of the capacity of all tracked Power 
Africa transactions (Figure 2).  
An important caveat of international initiatives supporting distribution in general is its 
governance complexity. While grid-connected generation expansion is usually governed 
centrally, distribution is largely a decentralised task involving a multitude of sub-national 
stakeholders. It can include reaching sparsely populated areas where the state lacks 
representation. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) serves as a case in point. While 
several electrification initiatives are targeting DRC to develop the prestigious hydro dam at 
Grand Inga valued at a record-setting 44 GW, considerably less efforts concern how to 
increase electricity access in a country where rural electrification is estimated to be below 1% 
(World Bank, 2018).  
With regards to economic issues, the present private company funding mechanism quickly 
pulls foreign companies into the electrification market in SSA. The market, which features 
the fastest growing demand worldwide (International Energy Agency, 2016b), is thereby 
effectively ceded to the foreign private sector. Between 2010 and 2015, Chinese companies 
alone were responsible for 30% of new capacity additions in SSA, a number that rises to 46% 
if South Africa is excluded (International Energy Agency, 2016a). Power Africa’s project 
pipeline includes over 100 transactions involving the US private sector which are set to 
increase US exports by USD 7 billion (Power Africa, 2017). Crucially, there currently is no 
obligation of a shared value approach in return, where the private companies align their 
business objectives to Africa’s societal challenges or actively foster the diffusion of 
knowledge. This is complicating the long-term development of an already technologically 
inferior domestic African electrification industry. Thomas Piketty argues that “[n]one of the 
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Asian countries that have moved closer to the developed country in the West in recent years 
has benefited from large foreign investment, whether it be Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan, 
and more recently China. In essence, all of these countries themselves financed the necessary 
investments in physical capital” ((Piketty, 2014), p.89-90). Furthermore, companies 
supported through Power Africa as well as Chinese companies have thus far heavily focused 
their activities on relatively stable, high-growth markets in selected Western, Eastern and 
Southern African countries as opposed to Sahel and Central African countries (International 
Energy Agency, 2016a; Power Africa, 2017). This raises concerns of cherry-picking the most 
profitable markets rather than pursuing a holistic developmental approach.  
Additionally, using aid to finance non-African companies can be seen as an extreme version 
of tied aid (where recipient governments are required to spend the aid on goods and services 
from the donor country). In the case of SSA’s power sector, donor countries like the US or 
China effectively choose which company is awarded a project in SSA, thereby reducing 
transparency for African governments compared to when they can procure services 
themselves. Tied aid has been widely argued to be economically inefficient for recipients. The 
additional costs incurred through tied aid have been estimated to range between 15 – 30% for 
goods and services (Clay et al., 2008). With respect to Africa’s power sector, Uganda’s 
President Yoweri Museveni has blamed the US developers of the Bujagali hydro dam for 
recent tariff increases in the country. As a consequence, the Ugandan government has 
emphasised its intentions to rely more heavily on domestic finance for Uganda’s electricity 
sector in the future. A contrary model to a donor country pre-selecting a project developer are 
competitive auctions where project developers can submit bids and the cheapest, viable 
proposal is awarded the contract. Renewable energy project auctions in South Africa’s 
Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REI4P) and 
Zambia’s Scaling Solar initiative have led to some of the lowest solar PV tariffs in the world 
at around USD 0.06 per kWh. Despite repeated efforts from the OECD to curtail tied aid, as 
of 2012, over one-third of U.S. total development aid was tied to procurement in the U.S. 
(Hook and Rumsey, 2016). 
In terms of environmental concerns, short-term profit maximisation may impede ecological 
sustainability. Natural gas plants in SSA cost USD 600 – 1000 per kW, 20–60% of the cost 
of renewable energy technologies (International Renewable Energy Agency, 2013). While 
Power Africa intends to promote renewables, natural gas has instead accounted for around 
70% of financially closed capacity additions facilitated through Power Africa so far (Power 
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Africa, 2017). As associated capacity factors are 1.5 – 4 times higher than for renewables 
(Trotter et al., 2017a), the share of carbon-based electricity in SSA is effectively increasing 
through current Power Africa projects. As long-term projections suggest financial optimality 
of renewables in SSA (International Renewable Energy Agency, 2015; World Energy 
Council, 2013), building fossil fuel plants today incurs avoidable, yet currently unconsidered 
long-term restructuring costs due to switching from fossil fuels to renewables. 
In summary, the current aid spending mechanism has produced a foreign dominance in SSA’s 
power sector which is set to increase the future reliance on foreign assistance. As political 
investment risk factors have not markedly improved in SSA in recent years (Trotter et al., 
2018), foreign companies are likely to depend on security guarantees similar to those given 
by OPIC and EXIM in the future. Hence, the current foreign support mechanisms are at danger 
of further increasing the sub-Saharan African power sector’s dependence on foreign aid. This 
constitutes a paradox, given that the ultimate goal of giving aid is commonly to decrease aid 
dependency in the future. This goal of decreasing aid dependency in the long run was 
explicitly brought up during the US House Hearing which discussed the legal basis for Power 
Africa (U.S. Government, 2014). 
 
Implications of the increasing number of foreign financers 
The increasing number of foreign financers has raised the amount of available finance in 
SSA’s power sector. As current level FDIs have been found to be an important driver for 
future investments in Africa (Mijiyawa, 2015), today’s growing activity is likely to facilitate 
follow-up investments which are crucial to meet the high capacity requirements in the coming 
decades (Figure 3). Once Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) have been signed, a steady and 
secure flow of capital has benefited timely construction of power plants. Externally financed 
Uganda’s GET FiT initiative or South Africa’s REI4P serve as examples in this regard.  
Yet, several concerns arise from the growing number of foreign financers. While overall ODA 
to SSA has remained constant, aid devoted to the energy sector has sharply risen since 2007 
(OECD, 2018). As international efforts coupled to energy increase, African governments have 
an incentive (or a necessity) to spend their budget elsewhere. As foreign investments 
increased threefold between 2014 and 2015, African governments decreased theirs by 30% in 
2015, and by a further 30% in 2016 (Figure 1). They have accounted for only 16% and 19% 
of SSA power sector capital expenditure in 2015 and 2016, respectively, roughly a third of 
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the share in the early 2000s (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia, 2010). Albeit different 
circumstances, increased foreign finance has similarly coincided with reduced African public 
investments during the SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s (Stein, 2003). The resulting decreased 
African ownership threatens rural electrification and energy equality, both have been shown 
to benefit from strong African accountability (see (Ahlborg et al., 2015; Kroth et al., 2016; 
Trotter, 2016) for econometric analyses, as well as (MacLean et al., 2016) for qualitative 
evidence on the importance of accountability in SSA’s electrification). 
A high share of foreign private sector stakeholders furthermore complicates accurate and 
efficient power infrastructure planning on several fronts. For instance, new challenges arise 
for reaching mutually satisfying agreements for power transactions which have to be carefully 
taken into consideration when matching future demand and supply. For instance, the 
negotiation process of PPAs between a national utility and an international developer can 
substantially prolong power projects. In Ethiopia, Icelandic generation company Reykjavik 
Geothermal in 2013 planned that the PPA for its 520 MW Corbetti geothermal project would 
be signed in Q1 2015 (Reykjavik Geothermal, 2013). Yet despite support from Power Africa, 
the signing of the PPA between RG and Ethiopian utility company Ethiopian Electric Power 
(EEP) was delayed by almost three years until December 2017. A senior EEP official 
explained the delay by pointing out that since it was Ethiopia’s first PPA, EEP lacked the 
technical capability to negotiate with an international energy firm equipped with an 
experienced legal team (Ezega, 2017). This prompted EEP to hire a legal consulting firm with 
financial support from the African Development Bank.  
In addition, the increased number of stakeholders puts pressures on Africa’s electrification 
institutions. For instance, after Côte d'Ivoire had opened up its domestic for private generation 
companies in 1994 by signing a PPA with CIPREL, owned by French generation company 
Eranove, an overhaul of power sector regulations ensued which created redundancies and 
unclear responsibilities. Numerous new institutions were installed, such as a supervisory body 
for national utility EECI, national electrification finance and technology institutions, and a 
panel to design national policy for electricity. Edjekumhene and Dubash (2002) describe the 
resulting governance complexities. They note that “[a]s a result, regulation, planning, and 
policymaking within the sector became increasingly duplicative and unclear. As one observer 
noted, ‘each private operator can literally pick the government body with which it is 
comfortable in order to solve its problem with the lowest possible risk’” ((Edjekumhene and 
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Dubash, 2002), p.123). The ensuing information asymmetry within the sector’s governing 
bodies have complicated centralised infrastructure planning for efficient resource usage.  
 
Implications of the current support beyond physical infrastructure 
The initiatives’ broadness is crucial to overcome institutional inefficiencies and capacity 
shortfalls (Trotter et al., 2017b). Their model, however, carries the risk of using generalised, 
pre-defined policy support toolkits for highly country-specific issues, a common problem of 
SAPs and PRSPs (Stein, 2003). Uganda, for instance, has been frequently called a ‘donor-
darling’ due to the heavy involvement from the International Financial Institutions in the 
country. However, it has suffered from low electrification rates and sector inefficiencies. The 
World Bank itself has acknowledged this problem in its assessment of its power sector 
engagement the 1990s and 2000s. A 2008 World Bank report on Uganda’s power sector noted 
that “[t]he Bank’s power sector policy and lending strategies of the 1990s, with their strong 
emphasis on unbundling and privatization, did not lead to better performance of the sector 
and increased access, because they were not applied with due consideration to the country’s 
characteristics” ((World Bank, 2008), p.xii). Specifically, the World Bank underestimated the 
effects private sector participation in the sector would have for Uganda. The Ugandan 
government was unable to address its contingent liabilities created through private sector 
participation in major power projects. System costs increased and projects struggled with 
delays. As a consequence, the World Bank was forced to officially rate performance in 
Uganda’s energy sector between 1991 and 2001 as “unsatisfactory” (World Bank, 2008). 
Despite these experiences, issues of overly broad approaches to the governance of 
electrification in SSA appear to remain present. Of all current external sub-Saharan African 
electrification initiatives reviewed by Quitzow et al. (2016), a vast majority of 84% focus on 
the entire sub-continent, whereas only 14% have a regional focus such as East or West Africa. 
This raises the concern to which extend the considerable differences of specific regions within 
SSA are currently being considered in most international initiatives. 
A multitude of such regional and country-level issues exist which require highly specialised 
governance approaches to achieve universal energy access. Complicated geographical 
settings are well-known to cause governance challenges in SSA, for instance in the Sahel 
countries and Sudan (Herbst, 2000). As electrification in SSA becomes more decentralised in 
remote areas, stakeholders need to be able to deal with highly specialised socio-cultural issues 
of rural constituencies. Some countries or territories, for instance Somalia, Central African 
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Republic or Northern Nigeria, cannot electrify without conflict resolution and ensuring basic 
security. Notably, continental-scale initiatives like Power Africa or Chinese efforts have 
mostly been unable to provide electrification endowments to such complex country cases 
(International Energy Agency, 2016a; Power Africa, 2017).  
Property rights with regards to land ownership, crucial for infrastructure construction, are 
another area where broad foreign interventions are at danger to not comprehensively 
incorporate the deeply country-specific and often informal institutions involved. Only a small 
fraction of land in SSA is titled and free to trade (Boone, 2014). Complex, socio-cultural 
customary land tenure regimes dominate. A lack of sensitivity towards these issues by 
applying broad developmental policies have been argued to inflame new forms of territorial 
politics and conflict in Côte d'Ivoire (Boone, 2007). With respect to the electricity sector, 
foreign companies who have bought land on a large scale for energy projects have become 
increasingly subject to protest in SSA (International Renewable Energy Agency, 2015a). In 
Uganda, transmission company UETCL has recently struggled with complex land tenure 
regimes while trying to secure land for new transmission lines. In response, the government 
has developed a plan to amend the constitution allowing it to take land without permission if 
a certain project is of national developmental importance. This has sparked a highly 
politicised debate in the country, the implications of which are difficult to predict for foreign 
stakeholders. For instance, the German-led GET FiT programme has achieved notable 
progress in its core task to increase generation capacity in Uganda, but has identified 
bottlenecks in Uganda’s transmission and distribution grid as its single most significant and, 
crucially, entirely exogenous risk for achieving its targets (KfW, 2017). Land access for solar 
PV plants in Nigeria are known to be problematic for foreign investors, despite the country’s 
high solar PV targets (Ohunakin et al., 2014).  
 
Implications of the current conditionalities 
The assistance conditionalities currently in place, such as free market reforms, import tax 
reductions and cost recovery requirements, further benefit foreign companies (Trotter and 
Abdullah, 2017). International pressure to cut subsidies and reduce import taxes undermines 
political self-determinism of the African developmental state (Mkandawire, 1999). Yet taxing 
imports and subsidising domestic companies are key policy instruments to protect domestic 
African infant electrification industries. In 2014, the Kenyan government dropped import 
taxes for all solar energy products to lower costs for solar PV installation in the country. While 
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the move has been hailed by non-profit organisations like UK charity Solar Aid, it has been 
criticised by Ubbink East Africa, the first solar module manufacturer in Kenya. Its managing 
director Haijo Kuper said that “[t]he new tax exemption, while being a very noble idea on the 
surface, will have negative effects on local manufacturers. The vibrant solar energy market 
that Kenya has developed will be flooded with cheap imports” (originally quoted in (Willis, 
2014)). 
The setting of electricity tariffs in SSA constitutes another area which is subject to external 
pressure. International organisations and initiatives involved in SSA’s power sector such as 
the World Bank and Power Africa demand the implementation of fully cost-reflective 
electricity tariffs (Kojima et al., 2014; US Agency for International Development, 2016). 
They explicitly question the usefulness of lifeline tariffs where the first few units of consumed 
electricity are sold cheaply to enable access for low income users. Historically, however, 
successful large-scale electrification cases have demonstrated the significance of a growing 
domestic electrification industry and considerable state intervention such as cross-subsidies 
and lifeline electricity tariffs, especially to serve the rural poor (e.g. in Korea, Thailand and 
Russia, see (Barnes and Floor, 1996; Van Gevelt, 2014)). In Peru, power sector privatisation 
with cost-reflective tariffs created important incentives for distribution companies to expand 
access, yet caused price increases which adversely affected the welfare of low-income 
consumers (Anaya, 2010). They had to be countered through a cross-subsidy social tariff 
scheme, which partly offset the price effects for low-income users.   
Implications of different levels of state interventionist electrification approaches in Africa are 
salient when comparing the cases of Ghana and Botswana to the cases of Uganda and 
Zimbabwe. Ghana managed to increase its rural electrification rate from 1% in 1990 to 63% 
in 2014 (World Bank, 2018), deeming it one of the most remarkable rural electrification 
success stories in SSA. Despite continued pressure from the IMF and the World Bank since 
the 1990s, Ghana’s government has managed to maintain ownership of its power sector and 
independently direct a state-driven approach to electricity provision (Edjekumhene and 
Dubash, 2002; Trotter, 2016). In one of its PRSP reviews, the IMF has criticized Ghana’s 
insistence on keeping lifeline tariffs for low income households (International Monetary 
Fund, 2004). State interventionist policies including lifeline tariffs have been key to expand 
affordable access in Ghana, leading to the citizenry holding long-standing expectations 
towards the government to provide electricity (MacLean et al., 2016). Although system costs 
are comparably low and the bill collection rate at 95%, Ghana’s tariffs for customers are too 
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low to recover the costs, requiring state subsidies to the utility (Trimble et al., 2016). 
Crucially, Ghanaian governments have understood rural electrification as part of a greater 
task of developmental nation-building. Similarly, Botswana has achieved notable rural 
electrification increases, largely driven by developmentalist, state-driven policies. After the 
government found that its original cost-recovery approach was too expensive for much of its 
rural population, it significantly decreased the initial down-payment required for a connection 
to a low standard rate. The remaining connection fee could be paid over a 15-year period. The 
government furthermore finances the extension of the grid to villages. As a result, 80% of the 
people connected through Botswana’s Rural Electrification Collective Scheme could not have 
been connected if the scheme had not existed (Prasad, 2008).  
By contrast, Uganda’s rural electrification rate has remained below 10%. The World Bank 
provided its first-ever loan to Uganda in 1962 to expand the Ugandan electricity network, 
with subsequent frequent engagements “cementing the Bank as a dominant advisor and funder 
of projects until the early 2000s” ((MacLean et al., 2016), p.114). Neoliberal reforms were 
implemented, including a full unbundling of the Uganda Electricity Board in 2001. A large-
scale privatisation of the sector limited governmental accountability and its capability to 
intervene. Consistent with the current international electrification initiatives’ focus on 
generation expansion, subsequent investments in Uganda greatly focused on highly visible 
generation projects rather than costly and decentralised distribution to villages far-removed 
from the grid. This has led to limited rural electrification gains. Uganda is one of only two 
countries in SSA which manage to cover the total costs of electricity services through what 
they collect from electricity customers (Trimble et al., 2016). The average cash collected per 
kWh from customers is 60% higher than in Ghana despite similar system costs. While a 
lifeline tariff exists in Uganda, private distribution company UMEME Ltd., responsible for 
over 95% of distribution in Uganda (Electricity Regulatory Authority, 2016), only applies it 
to the first 15 kWh per month (for comparison, in Kenya, the lifeline tariffs is applied to the 
first 50 kWh, and Ghana’s two-stage lifeline tariff is effective for the first 300 kWh consumed 
per month). UMEME’s profit-driven approach has led it to repeatedly cut electricity access 
for low-income customers, as well as to hospitals and health centres where bills were overdue. 
In some areas, this has significantly affected the ability to deliver adequate health care services 
(Walukamba, 2014). The Ugandan experience is comparable to Zimbabwe’s, where the power 
sector has been dominated by neoliberal, market-based and cost-recovery oriented policies 
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since World Bank interventions in the 1990s (Söderholm, 1999). Zimbabwe’s rural 
electrification in 2014 has similarly remained below 10%.  
Consistent with Van Gevelt’s (2014) argument for South Korea, these African cases suggest 
that in the absence of profitable sales markets, successful rural electrification appears to be 
more likely to occur where it has been driven by the state as part of an integrated, long-term 
national development strategy rather than being left to market forces.  
 
Summary of implications and impact 
Table 1 summaries the implications of the four identified foreign support mechanisms in 
SSA’s electricity sector as well as their potential impact on development sustainability.  
Foreign support 
mechanism 
Implications Potential impact on developmental sustainability 
1. Usage of aid to 
finance non-
African companies 
Direct involvement of the 
private sector  
Increased scale to realise economic development potential 
Mandate focusing on business 
interests  
Challenge for large-scale rural electrification as low 
income levels often prohibit profitable electricity sales 
African electrification market 
ceded to global companies  
Exacerbated domestic industry development and 
economically inefficient way of spending aid 
Growing importance of financial 
vis-à-vis environmental decision 
criteria 
 
Danger of de-prioritising renewable and decentralised off-
grid solutions due to higher investment cost per MW 
2. Increasing 
number of foreign 
financers 
Unprecedented level of finance 
availability  
Likely effect of further subsequent investments by 
overcoming the initial finance barrier 
Decreased incentive for African 
domestic investments   
Long-term threat through decreased African ownership and 
donatee mindset  
Increased complexities for 
comprehensive power system 
planning 
 
Risks of establishing a sub-optimal institutional setup as 
well as inefficient resource usage  
3. Support beyond 
physical 
infrastructure 
Institutional reforms and 
capacity building  
Improved capacities for delivering successful 
electrification programmes long-term 
Increased dependence on foreign 
broad-brush interventions  
A variety of highly country-specific issues are not 
addressed through standardised interventions 
4. Conditionalities Limited policy options for 
African governments  
Historically successful state intervention policies and 
domestic industry protection (cf. Korea, Thailand, Russia, 
Ghana, Botswana) are more difficult to implement 
Legend:  flags a potentially positive, and  a potentially negative impact on developmental sustainability. 
 
Table 1: Implications and impact of foreign support mechanisms 
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
While foreign involvement is starting to overcome several electrification barriers in SSA, its 
current design implies different developmental issues. We recommend a complementary mix 
of interventions for each of the four identified mechanisms. 
1. Redirect foreign public funds: 
 Rural electrification needs to be the biggest public sector priority in SSA to increase 
access figures substantially. As profit-driven approaches are unlikely to solve the 
problem, foreign public funds should be redirected towards socially-minded finance 
instruments to enable universal rural electrification. Available proven approaches 
include long-term rural electrification cross-subsidies, affordable credit lending with 
long-term loan repay times, credit co-operations, renting and East African pay-as-you-
go schemes (Abdullah and Jeanty, 2011). 
 A self-sustaining, domestic electrification industry would help reduce foreign 
dependencies and tackle electrification long-term (Trotter and Abdullah, 2017). Public 
electrification initiatives should aim to develop the African private sector rather than 
relying on foreign companies. The creation of adequate knowledge and skill levels is 
key for any successful domestic industry. To foster knowledge transfer, participation 
in SSA’s rapidly growing electrification market should be viewed as an African asset. 
In the medium-term, market access could be priced with technology transfer to African 
companies. For instance, China requires foreign technology companies to form joint 
ventures with technologically inferior Chinese companies (Si and Bruton, 1999). In 
addition, minimum local job creation and local content levels should be mandatory, 
similar to South Africa’s REI4P requirements (International Renewable Energy 
Agency, 2017).  
 Public efforts to develop a domestic African electrification industry should focus on 
renewable energy technologies. Their evolving nature, small-scale applicability in 
beyond-the-grid systems, and high future demand make near-term competitive 
advantages more likely than other technologies. This would furthermore limit future 
infrastructure restructuring costs. 
2. Increase African ownership: 
 To lessen African governments adapting a mindset of relying on foreign investments 
and encourage domestic African finance and electrification investments, foreign funds 
18 
 
could be coupled to African commitments more tightly, functioning as variable top-
ups of the latter where applicable. 
 To manage the growing number of stakeholders, African electrification agencies need 
to be supported to improve managerial and procedural efficiencies. A stronger 
cooperation of donor initiatives would decrease interfacing requirements and create 
synergies (see (Tagliapietra and Bazilian, 2017)). For example, the newly established 
Sino-German Center for Sustainable Development provides German-administered 
vocational training to Africans in Chinese-led infrastructure projects in SSA. 
3. Customise policy interventions:  
 The spectrum of non-technological assistance should be widened and more closely 
designed according to country-specific circumstances. Where population densities are 
low, electrification agencies and state-owned enterprises should be supported to move 
from established grid-focused business models to new, more decentralised governance 
approaches which are able to cope with off-grid rural electrification at scale. 
Furthermore, where necessary, interventions should target security increases, sub-
national energy inequalities reductions, and socio-cultural considerations. To create 
transparency and manage investor expectations, policy interventions should be 
communicated with accurate timelines for change to materialise. 
4. Ease current types of conditionalities: 
 Conditionalities related to market-based reforms and cost-recovery requirements 
should be made more flexible to allow state intervention where rural electrification 
does not offer short-term financial gains. To foster African governments’ political will 
to lead long-term electrification, it is crucial to not repeat the mistakes of SAPs which 
undermined African self-determinism and resulted in many African governments 
falling out with international financial institutions. As the SDGs necessarily includes 
all countries in SSA, political conditionalities attached to finance directly oppose the 
SDGs’ inherent comprehensiveness. 
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